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Beauty, Eh? In Defense of Thirding and (Lewisian) Halfing
So how’s it goin’, eh? Our topic for today is Sleeping Beauty.
It could be argued that there are already too many papers on this topic. But, there
probably aren’t many written by mathematicians, and fewer by mathematicians who have
read at least half (well, okay, a third) of the literature. Being such, this one may offer
a fresh perspective. Although I am primarily attempting to increase understanding of
several neglected mathematical issues, however, I have not resisted the temptation to offer
my own philosophical take on their significance for the problem. My overall conclusion
will be that the one-third and the (Lewisian) one-half solutions are both fine, albeit for
different readings of credence. Hopefully whatever philosophical naivete´ is on display in
these few paragraphs can be forgiven,1 and will not prevent readers from seeing that the
mathematical portions may in fact advance the overall discussion non-trivially.
1. Take off, eh? No roads lead to violations of countable additivity.
In [9] there is an argument purporting to show that the one-third solution to the Sleeping
Beauty problem is at odds with countable additivity of probabilities. The argument re-
quires a scenario in which a rational agent is subjected to an experiment whose expected
duration, by her own lights, is infinite. In spite of this implausibility, the argument seems
to have gained many adherents. Nevertheless, the scenario in question is of a kind famil-
iar to mathematicians, who have routinely cautioned against the danger of adopting bad
models of their type–the very confusion that [9] capitalizes on.2 (Brutal, eh?)
In the version I will consider, Beauty is a rational agent participating in an experiment
in which a coin is tossed on Sunday night. Beauty is awakened Monday morning, asked
her credence in heads and told the outcome. If the coin landed heads, that’s the end of
the experiment. If tails, Beauty is given a drug that puts her to sleep for another 24
hours and erases all memory of her Monday awakening. Then on Tuesday morning she
is again awakened, asked her credence in heads, told the outcome, and that’s the end of
the experiment. The problem is what Beauty’s credence in heads should be on Monday
morning. A halfer says one-half. A thirder says one-third. More generally, a Sleeping
Beauty problem is defined to be “a problem in which a fully rational agent, Beauty, will
undergo one or more mutually indistinguishable awakenings...” ([9]) where the number of
1Along with the summary offences of cluttering Sleeping Beauty bibliographies further
and employing dubious cultural references (which temptation I have also failed to resist).
2Though I’ll eschew technical details here, the original, repeated Sleeping Beauty prob-
lem can be modeled by a positive recurrent Markov chain, with the one-third solution
corresponding to its stationary probability measure. The example of [9] (Sleeping Beauty
in St. Petersburg; see below) is a null recurrent chain, and, as such, lacks stationary prob-
ability distributions; for the received philosophical interpretation of this state of affairs
among mathematicians, see e.g. Chapter 6 of [3], in particular pages 286 and 294.
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such awakenings is a function of a random variable into a set S of hypotheses.
One argument for the one-third solution is that, if the experiment were repeated many
times, the expected asymptotic density of heads awakenings would be 13 . The argument in
[9] begins with the claim that the thirder utilizes the following “indifference principle”:
Finitistic Sleeping Beauty Indifference (FSBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for
any hypothesis h in S, if the number of times Beauty awakens conditional on h is
finite, then upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each of the
awakening possibilities associated with h.
FSBI, together with some other innocuous premises, leads to the following two principles
(it does not seem that both are needed, and the former follows from the latter).
Generalized Thirder Principle (GTP). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, upon first
awakening, Beauty’s credence in any given hypothesis in S must be proportional
to the product of the hypothesis’ objective chance and the number of times Beauty
will awaken conditional on this hypothesis.
Frequency. In any sleeping Beauty problem, if Beauty knew that the experiment
was to be repeated many times then her credence in any hypothesis h ∈ S should
be proportional to the expected long-run frequency of h-awakenings.
An example is given showing that Frequency (and/or GTP) is in conflict with:
Countable Additivity (CA). For any set of countably many centered or uncentered
propositions, any two of which are incompatible, rationality requires that one’s
credences in the propositions in this set sum to one’s credence in their disjunction.
Here is the example.
Sleeping Beauty in St. Petersburg (SBSP). Let S = N and suppose that Beauty
awakens 2X times, where X is a random variable with P (X = n) = 2−n, n ∈ N.
As the expected duration of an SBSP experiment is infinite, the asymptotic frequency of
X = n awakenings is zero for all n. According to Frequency, then, Beauty should upon
awakening have credence zero in each of the assertions X = n. But she has credence
1 in their disjunction. This violates CA. Alternatively, by GTP Beauty should, upon
awakening, assign equal credences to the exhaustive and mutually exclusive assertions
X = n. This too violates CA.
The problem with this argument is that no rational thirder would literally adopt FSBI, for
the simple reason that, with non-zero probability, the experiment will end between any first
and second tails awakenings. That our original thirder ignores such remote possibilities is
innocent–it matters little, and it would be difficult to communicate without such sanctions.
The innocence dries up quickly in the SBSP example, however. Indeed, consideration of
a single possibility as fantastic as that while Beauty is asleep she is, through a series of
quantum mishaps, tranformed into a golden toque (or a Golden Molson, eh?) suffices to
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make finite Beauty’s expectation of the experiment’s duration, which effectively eliminates
any perceived tension involving countable additivity.3
Here are some details. First, if we are being literal, FSBI needs to be replaced by:
Finitistic Sleeping Beauty Difference (FSBD). If the number of times Beauty awak-
ens is M , then for any hypothesis h in S, upon first awakening, Beauty’s credence
in the kth awakening associated with h should be proportional to Ch(M ≥ k|h).
Here Ch(·) is objective chance. Observe now that FSBD, together with other plausible
hypotheses (first night mortality rates independent of h and credences in first h awakenings
proportional to Ch(h)), implies that Beauty’s absolute credence in the kth awakening
associated with h should be
P (h ∧ k) =
Ch(h) · Ch(M ≥ k|h)∑
j∈S,l∈NCh(j) · Ch(M ≥ l|j)
=
Ch(h) · Ch(M ≥ k|h)
E(M)
.
Summing over k ∈ N, Beauty’s credence in h should be
P (h) =
Ch(h) · E(M |h)
E(M)
.
It is convenient now to define the fidelity of an implementation of a Sleeping Beauty
experiment as Ch(N = M), where N is the number of times Beauty is told she will awaken
and M is the number of times Beauty does awaken. The variation distance between two







We have seen that under suitable hypotheses Beauty’s credence in h is P (h) = Ch(h)·E(M|h)
E(M) .
It follows that if E(N) <∞ then as fidelity approaches 1 Beauty’s credences will converge
in variation to the distribution Q(h) = Ch(h)·E(N|h)
E(N) . On the other hand if E(N) = ∞
then as fidelity approaches 1 Beauty’s credence in h will approach zero for every h and,
consequently, Beauty’s credence functions will diverge in variation. It is natural to say
that in the former case, the distribution Q constitutes a solution to the problem, while in
the latter case there is no solution.
3It is tempting to object that this amounts to changing the problem, but that is not so.
The change came earlier, when Beauty decided that Monday and Tuesday tails awakenings
were equally likely. This seemingly insignficiant change was justified because it simplified
her model. But modeling assumptions are always subject to the condition that outputs of
interest (e.g. conformity with CA) be continuous relative to inputs. Models that fail this
condition (null recurrent Markov chains such as SBSP, in particular) are bad models–they
fail to cast light on the behavior of systems with approximating inputs.
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This is consistent with CA. It also recovers the one-third solution. Unless, of course, one
objects that now Beauty is assigning credence .3333343209... to heads and is therefore no
longer a real thirder; perhaps real thirders still run afoul of CA per [9]. I’m not sure about
that but won’t argue. One can say what one likes about thirders in that sense because in
that sense there aren’t any thirders to take offense.
2. Let’s make a deal, eh? Monty Hall shuts the door on non-Lewisian halfers.
Let’s analyze the problem using the logarithmic scoring rule,4 where the agent with es-
timate p for P (heads) scores the negative of surprisal, here log p if heads and log(1 − p)
if tails. Assuming a fair coin, minimum expected surprisal occurs at p = 1
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(a calculus
exercise). But Beauty is surprised twice if the coin lands tails; some might contend that
her surprisal is actually 2 log(1−p) in this event, with minimum expectation at p = 13 . Ob-
viously the thirder is committed to the latter mode of accounting, the halfer to the former.
I believe that both modes of accounting make sense; the thirder regards de se information
as admissible, whereas for the halfer, only propositional information is admissible.5
Here’s another argument that both solutions make sense: consider what would happen
in the original repeated experiment if instead of erasing Beauty’s memory we just didn’t
tell her the times or results of the tosses. So Beauty is just living life as usual and in the
next room someone is tossing a coin some evenings, skipping a evening after each tails.
What credence should Beauty assign to the previous toss having landed heads? I hope the
question sounds ambiguous. Say the previous toss was the seventeenth toss. There’s a de
dicto reading, on which Beauty should assign credence 13 to the previous toss, whichever
one that was, having landed heads, and a de re reading, on which Beauty should assign
credence 12 to the actual previous toss, i.e. the seventeenth toss, having landed heads.
Beauty herself doesn’t suffer this ambiguity, as the de re reading is not available to her.
But in the original problem, where her memory is erased, it is. The 1
3
reading is still
available too, though one should probably call it a de se reading now.
If this is right, then there should be, even among thirders, a strong inclination to char-
itability regarding efforts to hammer out the details of a one-half solution.6 The halfer
4Only the logarithmic rule is linear with respect to surprisal, which is, it would seem,
the quantity rational agents trafficking in information seek to minimize.
5To elaborate: in order for both to count, the Monday and Tuesday tails surprisals must
derive from non-identical (independent, in fact, if both are to count fully) revelations. As
propositions, the Monday and Tuesday tails surprisals do derive from identical revelations,
namely the coin landed tails. Beauty may, for all we know, have been (propositionally)
omniscient but for knowledge of that toss (even though she doesn’t know what day it is;
cf. the omniscient gods in [6]), and she can’t be scored minus two bits if she came in only
one bit shy of a complete state description. In contrast, Monday’s and Tuesday’s de se
surprisals derive from the doxastically independent assertions this is a tails awakening.
6The surprisal-minimization argument gives some inkling as to how this might be done.
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must make two critical choices. First: whether or not to accept Elga’s “restricted principle
of indifference” [1], namely whether to accept that P (Monday tails) = P (Tuesday tails).
I will assume that halfers who do not explicitly deny the principle accept it. (Cf. [2]; I
don’t consider here the view, which may have merit, that halfing Beauty should leave de
se events unmeasurable.) Second: how to update propositional credences in the light of de
se evidence.
Because it’s convenient (and amusing), I’ll analyze the second question using a more-than-
vaguely-familiar Sleeping Beauty problem in which there are three hypotheses of equal
objective chance. The setup: there are three doors. A roll of a fair die determines which of
the doors will have a new car placed behind it. The other doors will have chickens placed
behind them. The hypothesis Door i corresponds to the state of affairs in which the new
car is behind Door i. If Door 1, then Beauty will have a single awakening, on Monday.
If Door 2, Beauty will have a single awakening, on Tuesday. And, if Door 3, Beauty will
have two awakenings, on Monday and Tuesday.
Halfers are committed to assigning each of the three doors credence 1
3
upon awakening. If
this isn’t obvious, consider that if Beauty asks whether Door 1 obtains and is told no, she
is in the position of the original problem with respect to the remaining possibilities, and
so must assign them equal credences. On the other hand, she updates on the proposition
not Door 1 by traditional conditioning, hence her prior credences in Door 2 and Door 3
are equal. Mutatis mutandis, her prior credences in Door 2 and Door 3 are equal.
Now the halfer asks what day it is, and after hearing the answer is asked for her updated
credence in Door 3. Some observations: if the answer is Monday, this rules out Door 1. If
the answer is Tuesday, this rules out Door 2. Door 3 cannot be eliminated. Recall that
our halfer has prior credence 13 in Door i for each i and, if she accepts Elga’s restricted
principle of indifference, Monday and Tuesday are equally likely conditioned on Door 3.
Such a halfer’s predicament is therefore isomorphic in protocol to that of the Monty Hall
problem when she has initially chosen Door 3 and seen the hypothesis Door 1 eliminated.
Accordingly, any halfer who updates credences by simple conditioning on not Door 1 is
committing the well-known fallacy of those who answer 12 in the Monty Hall problem.
Namely, conditioning on the proposition learned instead of conditioning on the fact that
it, among other candidate propositions, was learned. No, Beauty’s credence in Door 3
must remain 13 upon learning what day it is. How do extant halfing schemes fare?
Roger White in [11] argues for the one-half solution based upon a variant of the original
problem in which, at each possibly current centered world, Beauty wakes up with prob-
Briefly...if only one tails surprisal is to count, a “one vote” policy must be instituted, ac-
cording to which Monday and Tuesday tails versions of Beauty, between them, get a single
information-theoretic vote, responsibility for which might be apportioned by stipulation,
lots or weighted average. I take it that the details of the one-third solution, meanwhile,
are uncontroversial.
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ability q < 1. White advocates updating credences at each experimental awakening by
conditioning on the propositional event there is at least one awakening. The general pol-
icy I take this to sanction is that one update credences in response to de se evidence by
conditioning on the largest propositional event consistent with that evidence. But in our
Monty Hallish scenario, where Beauty finds out that it’s Monday, this sanctions the fallacy
of conditioning on not Door 1, arriving at 1
2
. (Failure.)
Christopher Meacham meanwhile in [9] introduces an intricate scheme, termed compart-
mentalized conditionalization, which is designed to yield values P (A|B) when A, B or both
are de se events. To gloss over details somewhat, in the current scenario, when Beauty
learns Tuesday, her 16 credence in Monday Door 3 is first transferred entirely to its surviv-
ing collocated alternative, Tuesday Door 3, then her 13 credence in the Door 1 hypothesis,
which has no surviving collocated alternative, is distributed among the alternatives of the
remaining hypotheses in proportion to their existing credences. (Failure again.7)
Finally, we consider the halfing scheme of David Lewis [3]. Like Meacham, Lewis accepts
Elga’s restricted principle of indifference, and so assigns both Monday Door 3 and Tuesday
Door 3 credences of 16 . He also uses standard conditionalization upon elimination of de se
alternatives, so his updated credence in Door 3 is 13 , which is, well...correct. (Beauty eh?)
So what exactly was it about Lewis’s scheme that seemed implausible enough that several
halfers saw a need to amend it? Compartmentalized conditionalization looks, at first blush,
like a plausible plan to rescue halfing from the attacks of thirders ([5] and [10], among
others) whose arguments may have appeared to suggest that Lewis’s conditioning scheme
wasn’t consistent with his original choice to assign heads a credence of 12 in Beauty’s original
predicament. Indeed, if we consider a situation in which heads and tails are to each result
in two awakenings (on Monday and Tuesday), and we imagine that, during an awakening,
Beauty finds out that Tuesday heads does not obtain, it might seem that Lewis is under
conflicting obligations to update credence in heads to: (a) 1
3
, because Lewis had previously
assigned credence 1
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to each possible alternative and uses standard conditioning to update
credences, and (b) 1
2
, since the situation is now just like that of the original problem. If
Lewis is in trouble, compartmentalized conditionalization might generate some sympathy.
However, Lewis is not in trouble. (Not, at least, on consistency grounds.) In his scheme,
the elimination of an alternative does not restore credences to what they would have been
had the alternative not existed in the first place. As he sees it, to get credences as they
would be if an alternative hadn’t existed in the first place, you distribute its credence
among its collocation partners. If the alternative gets eliminated, on the other hand, its
credence gets distributed among all surviving alternatives, collocated or not. Lewis is
not explicit on the point, but we can infer it from the fact that Lewis updates Beauty’s
credence in heads to 23 when Tuesday is eliminated, whereas if the Tuesday awakening
7The updating schemes of White and Meacham appear to be identical when updating
credence on propositions by elimination of alternatives, so their fates are linked here.
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hadn’t existed in the first place, Beauty’s credence in heads would just be 12 .
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So much for halfers who accept Elga’s restricted principle of indifference. What of those
who deny it? The Monty Hall argument doesn’t apply to them. Are there such halfers?
In fact there are. Patrick Hawley [4] argues that in the original problem, Beauty should
assign credence 1 to Monday (and thus in particular to Monday conditioned on tails). His
argument has two premises. (1) P (heads) = 12 , and (2) P (heads|Monday) =
1
2 . An implicit
third premise, then, is the multiplication rule (3) P (A ∧B) = P (A)P (B|A). These three
premises are not simultaneously satisfied in any of the systems we’ve looked at. Halfers
accept (1), thirders, White and Meacham accept (2), thirders and Lewis accept (3). The
status of this argument is therefore unclear.
The key point, perhaps, is merely that the premises are independently plausible and con-
sistent, so that one may simply adopt them as axioms. This view is coherent. If Lewis
can ask (and he has, in effect) that Beauty’s Monday and Tuesday tails versions each be
weighted by a factor of one-half, or perhaps that a coin toss will determine which is to
receive full weight, why not just always count Monday’s version? On the other hand,
the view is quite arbitrary, for whatever one can say in favor of assigning full weight to
Monday Beauty, one can as easily say in favor of assigning full weight to Tuesday Beauty.9
Hawley writes: “the best compromise...might well be to believe to degree 1 that it is Mon-
day whenever she awakens. She will be surely be right on Monday, and possibly never be
wrong about the day during the experiment.” Consider however so-called Mondrue, which
is like Monday whenever the coin lies heads and like Tuesday whenever the coin lies tails.
In favor of this freshly minted day one might counter: “the best compromise...might well
be to believe to degree 1 that it is Mondrue whenever she awakens. She will be surely be
right on Mondrue, and possibly never be wrong about the day during the experiment.”
Well, that’s our topic for today. To recapitulate my findings: thirding coheres with ac-
cepted principles of probability. Arguments presented by others on previous occasions show
it to be also reasoned and natural. Lewisian halfing, which has been kicked about rather
unfairly, turns out to be coherent and reasoned as well. On the other hand it’s probably
natural only to the most eccentric of rational agents. Hawley-style halfing is coherent too,
but arbitrary. Other forms of halfing are incoherent.
So good day, eh?
8Lewis’s policies are an example of “one vote accounting”. Suppose Beauty sends herself
a postcard during each awakening, and on Wednesday morning (her memory having been
wiped again), must read her credence in heads off of a single postcard (selected, in case of
tails, at random). She will then record Lewisian probabilities.
9If that’s not arbitrary enough, one could presumably assign Monday weight q and
Tuesday weight 1− q for any q ∈ [0, 1]. Only q = 12 (i.e. Lewisian halfing) appears to have
any respect for symmetry.
7
References
[1] Elga, Adam. 2000. “Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem.” Analysis
60:143-147.
[2] Elga, Adam. 2010. “Subjective probabilities should be sharp.” Philosophers’ Imprint
10(5).
[3] Gallager, Robert G. 2011. Stochastic Process: Theory for Applications (draft). Avail-
able at http://www.rle.mit.edu/rgallager/notes.htm
[4] Hawley, Patrick. 2012. “Inertia, Optimism and Beauty.” Nous. To appear. Available
at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5319/1/iob.pdf
[5] Horgan, Terry. 2004 “Sleeping Beauty awakened: new odds at the dawn of the new
day.” Analysis 63: 10-21.
[6] Lewis, David. 1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” The Philosophical Review 88:
513-543.
[7] Lewis, David. 2001. “Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.” Analysis 61:171-176.
[8] Meacham, Christopher. 2008. Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Beliefs.
Philosophical Studies 138: 24569.
[9] Ross, Jacob. 2010. “Sleeping Beauty, countable additivity, and rational dilemmas.”
The Philosophical Review 119: 411-447.
[10] Weintraub, Ruth. 2004. “Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution.” Analysis 64: 8-10.
[11] White, Roger. 2006. “The generalized Sleeping Beauty problem: a challenge for
thirders.” Analysis 66: 114-119.
rmcctchn@memphis.edu
8
